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Abstract 
Between 1968 and 1975, the leaders of white South Africa reached out to independent African 
leaders. Scholars have alternately seen these counterintuitive campaigns as driven by a quest 
for regional economic hegemony, divide-and-lure realpolitik, or a desire to ingratiate the 
regime with the West. This article instead argues that the South African government’s 
outreach was intended as a top-down recalibration of the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism, 
as the regime endeavored to detach its apartheid program from notions of colonialist racial 
supremacy, and instead reach across the color line and lay an equal claim to the power and 
protection of African nationalism. These diplomatic maneuverings, therefore, serve as a prism 
through which to understand important shifts in state identity, ideological renewal, and the 
adoption of new state-building models. 
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AFRICANIZING APARTHEID: IDENTITY, IDEOLOGY, AND STATE-BUILDING  
IN POST-INDEPENDENCE AFRICA 
Jamie Miller, Cornell University 
 
On 16 August 1971, the leaders of white South Africa’s parliament, executive, 
foreign service, and military congregated on the tarmac of Waterkloof Air Force base in 
Pretoria. In the wake of the Afro-Asian assault on apartheid in the early 1960s, visits by 
foreign statesmen were rare. But the guest arriving that day, the regime’s leaders 
believed, could change all that. Malawian President-for-Life Hastings Banda’s five-day 
state visit was the first to South Africa by the head of an independent African country. 
He was welcomed with a twenty-one gun salute at the airport and whisked down the 
new N1 highway to Johannesburg’s President Hotel, where up to 3000 South Africans – 
white and black – awaited the spectacle.1 Pretoria spared no expense, as Prime Minister 
John Vorster fêted the Malawian leader at a series of banquets.
2
 Banda did not leave his 
hosts disappointed. ‘South Africa doesn’t need a certificate of respectability,’ he told the 
press: ‘It already has one.’3 
Banda was not alone. In the years between Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller’s 
first visit to Malawi in 1968 and South Africa’s disastrous intervention in the Angolan 
Civil War in the second half of 1975, Vorster’s ‘outward policy’ prompted a flurry of 
bilateral meetings between South African representatives and their African 
counterparts.
4
 By the time of Banda’s visit, South Africa already had regular dialogue 
with just under half of all the countries in independent Africa.
5
 Then, in response to the 
Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the pending decolonisation of the Angolan and 
Mozambican bookends of South Africa’s cordon sanitaire of white-ruled states, Vorster 
launched a parallel campaign aimed specifically at Southern Africa, which quickly came 
to be known as ‘détente’ (1974–5).6 Why did Pretoria reach out to independent Africa 
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through its ‘outward policy’ and ‘détente’ campaigns? How did the apartheid regime 
reconcile such a course with its racial hierarchies at home?
7
  
Although these counter-intuitive events have attracted no shortage of attention, 
scholars have been signally divided in their analyses. One school has seen Pretoria’s 
African outreach as driven primarily by economic considerations.
8
 ‘The requirements of 
economic expansion were vitally important in the shaping of South Africa’s policies 
towards Africa’, Sam Nolutshungu declared.9 Others take the economic argument 
further, spelling out its strategic corollaries. The outward policy was designed to 
establish a sphere of hegemony throughout Southern Africa, asserted Sean Gervasi.
10
 
Eschewing economic rationales, a second school has seen the outward policy as an 
essentially geopolitical programme designed to corrode the Republic’s international 
isolation by working through Africa.
11
 In a resilient variation, numerous studies 
interpret Pretoria’s African outreach as a detour – an end run, in American parlance – to 
improving relations with the West.
12
  
Much of this literature was written contemporaneously. Often working with 
limited or no access to South African archives, scholars inevitably made extensive 
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assumptions about how Pretoria engaged with independent Africa based on their 
understanding of its relationship with black Africans at home, neglecting the white 
polity’s own perceptions of that relationship. Among the economic school, Marxian 
classifications of South Africa’s racial hierarchies as a sophisticated vertical class 
structure were often highly influential, informing a common identification of Pretoria’s 
outreach into Africa as an extension of exploitative capitalist interests.
13
Although this 
theoretical approach has largely long since fallen into disfavour, the economic thesis 
continues to cast a long shadow. In the most detailed recent study, Roger Pfister depicts 
South Africa’s outreach into Southern Africa, at least, as being economic in nature,14 
though the archival evidence confirms Adrian Guelke’s earlier speculation that Pretoria 




The geopolitical thesis casts Pretoria’s outreach as an exercise in realpolitik, 
with limited exploration of the intellectual currents and political dynamics beneath the 
two-dimensional diplomatic surface.
16
 Yet to understand what African outreach meant, 
we need to grasp how apartheid and African nationalism were variously understood in 
the corridors of power in Pretoria, through reference to the ideas and historical 
experiences that shaped the Afrikaner National Party’s (NP) ruling ideologies.17 Much 
like the prospect of increased trade with independent Africa, potential improvements in 
Pretoria’s standing in Washington - an important consideration in the regime’s overall 
foreign policy profile - were hardly unapparent to South African policymakers.
18
 But 
the thesis that African outreach specifically was ‘directed as much at Washington as at 
Africa’,19 as expressed in perhaps the most sophisticated of these analyses, reflects a 
decidedly outdated ‘centre-periphery’ model of Cold War relations. Newer approaches 
to international history,
20
 recent calls to include settler societies in understandings of 
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 and moves to foreground the domestic political scene in African 
history,
22
 as well as the fruits of a broader archival base, all direct the historian’s lens 
towards the ideological factors informing South African state agency, specifically 
evolving conceptions of Afrikaner nationalism in a localised African context. 
On a purely diplomatic level, Pretoria indeed strove to exploit cleavages on the 
African scene that cut across anti-apartheid sentiments and thereby gain limited forms 
of international acceptance. Yet this article argues that African outreach was intended to 
do much more. Vorster’s aim was to create a forum in which Pretoria could advance a 
new state identity underpinning longer-term security: the acceptance of the Afrikaner 
community as part of independent Africa via an ‘Africanisation’ of apartheid. As James 
Brennan and Jonathan Glassman have variously demonstrated, the racial divisions 
stratifying post-colonial social orders were not innate, but constructed and contested 
structures, shaped alternately by specific processes of pre- and post-independence 
governance, tensions between communities for resources and status, and self-
identification through metaphor and discourse.
23
 Amid substantial opposition, Vorster 
sought to navigate much the same process and manipulate it to the Afrikaners’ 
advantage. Nationalist leaders were no more immune to the ‘contradictions of 
accumulation and control’, in John Lonsdale and Bruce Berman’s term, than their 
imperial predecessors or white counterparts elsewhere on the continent: they had to 
keep Africans in a position of subjugation and exploitation, while simultaneously being 
seen to govern for the benefit of the social order as a whole.
24
 Vorster’s strategy for 
dealing with this challenge in a changing world was to fundamentally reshape the 
ideological basis for the regime’s existing racial hierarchies through embedding South 
Africa’s existing apartheid order, with some minimal alterations, in a different network 
of values and norms. Apartheid would be rearticulated both to black Africa and to the 
white electorate as representing a network of interdependent nations – each with an 
equal claim to African nationalism - rather than a hierarchical system entrenching white 
racial dominance. Pretoria’s relationship with independent Africa became the central 
engine for this landmark shift. If Africa’s opposition to South Africa was largely a 
function of the perception that apartheid was among the last and most oppressive 
vestiges of colonialism, then Vorster’s African outreach was an attempt to shatter this 
association between Pretoria and the practices of European empires by redefining 
apartheid into the norms of the post-independence era. Statecraft was conscripted in the 
service of state-building; diplomacy in the service of ideological renewal. This was not 
an effort merely to divide and lure African leaders, or to get back in Washington’s good 
graces. It was a campaign to contest and shape the definition of a legitimate African 
state. 
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The first part of this article charts the emergence of Vorster’s 
reconceptualisation of the Afrikaner national project. The second explores his initial 
efforts to establish a foundation in foreign policy for reimagining of  the regime’s 
relationship with African nationalism. Finally, this article explains how Vorster 
bolstered this vision through détente policies that distanced his regime from both 
erstwhile allies across Southern Africa, as well as exploring the increased domestic 
opposition to his new agenda that this shift provoked. 
 
‘WE ARE NOT EUROPEANS’ 
The ideological edifice of the apartheid state as envisaged by John Vorster’s 
predecessor, Hendrik Verwoerd (1958-66), was unapologetically exclusive, driven 
explicitly by the unilateral preservation of Afrikaner independence.
25
 That edifice stood 
on twin foundations: the nationalist precepts espoused by mid-century Afrikaner 
intellectuals, often expressed through religious tropes; and norms and discourses that 
drew directly on conceptions of racial supremacy.
26
 The Afrikaner had been ‘planted 
here at the southern point’ of Africa, he proclaimed in a landmark 1958 speech 
commemorating the 1838 Boer victory over the Zulus at Blood River, ‘so that from this 
resistance group… all that has been built up since the days of Christ may be maintained 
for the good of all mankind.’ Just as the original voortrekkers [Afrikaner pioneers] had 
been decried by hostile missionaries for insisting that ‘the supremacy of the white man’ 
was ‘necessary’ for civilised development, as Western powers forsook traditional bonds 
of race in the era of decolonisation, it once more fell to whites in Africa to ‘be an anchor 
and a stay for Western civilisation and for the Christian religion’.27 Such ideologies 
were equally expressed in Cold War terms, with communism positioned as the atheistic, 
barbaric antithesis of ‘civilisation’.28  
As newly independent African and Asian states pushed South Africa to the brink 
of expulsion from the international community in 1960-1, Verwoerd vaunted a practical 
solution to the emergence of African nationalism: the creation of homelands or 
bantustans.
29
 Blacks would be expelled from the white state and granted the opportunity 
to progress separately towards ‘survival and full development, politically and 
economically’.30 However, the ideological basis of Afrikaner legitimacy and control 
remained unchanged. ‘[T]his Republic is part of the White man’s domain in the 
world… He, and the spirit with which he is endowed… will always be needed where 
order and peace and progress are desired,’ Verwoerd reiterated in 1966.31 While the 
regime continues to occupy an ambiguous position in historical narratives of 
colonialism, the ideological discourse of the Verwoerd era was decidedly ‘colonialist’ 
                                                          
25
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31
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or ‘neo-colonial’ in that it unashamedly sought to maintain and reproduce much of the 
discredited conceptual foundation that had sustained European colonial projects in 
Africa.   
Upon Verwoerd’s assassination, Vorster’s central political priority comprised 
the fulfilment of his predecessor’s separate development vision. However, Vorster 
realised that the old framework of norms, values, and institutions that sustained the 
South African regime both domestically and abroad was losing currency, such that 
pursuing the separate development goal within the existing conceptual framework 
would lead only to unsustainable isolation. He therefore sought new scaffoldings of 
legitimacy for the state by embarking on a most unexpected political campaign: to 
corrode the identification of his regime as a brutal remnant of European colonialism and 
redefine the white polity as part of independent Africa. 
After only six months in office, he launched this campaign in a speech in the 
Afrikaner heartland in Bloemfontein. In the nineteenth century and culminating in the 
Boer Wars, he stressed, Afrikaners had formed ‘the first African state to have revolted 
against [British] imperialism. It [was] the first state in whose midst there were cries for 
emancipation and independence.’ From this invented tradition of anti-colonialism 
emerged a claim to the nativist territorial nationalism of the post-independence era: 
‘[W]e are in every respect a part of Africa.’32 On the face of it, this was simply an 
extension of a pre-existing strand in the Nationalist canon.
33
 However, Vorster’s 
purpose was quite different, as he then used this reformulation of the historical 
foundations of Afrikaner nationalism as a platform from which to conceptually reshape 
apartheid around norms of interdependence and co-existence rather than dominance and 
hierarchy. ‘[I]f Nationalism was right for my people then it is right for anyone, 
irrespective of his colour or identity’, he continued.34 The erstwhile language of 
unbridled white dominance was slowly eschewed. Instead, the watchword became co-
existence of white and black on an equal footing, both inside the republic’s borders 
between the regime and the homelands and on the continent as a whole. Vorster was 
determined to appropriate the very same principles which South Africa’s enemies used 
to attack the regime—anti-colonialism, the elimination of racial hierarchies, and self-
determination—adapt them to the Verwoerdian programme of separate development, 
and use the new constructs to justify Afrikaner independence and viability at the core of 
a broader white power structure. 
This was no mere shift in emphasis or style from his predecessor. Despite his 
creation of the homeland vision, Verwoerd’s conceptualisation of Afrikanerdom 
retained a fundamentally inimical relationship with African nationalism. Just before his 
death, Verwoerd met with Leabua Jonathan, soon to be leader of independent Lesotho, 
but pointedly refrained from lunching with him.
35
 In contrast, Vorster believed that the 
emergence in the post-independence era of the nation-state as the sole repository of 
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legitimate sovereignty opened a path to justify Afrikaner legitimacy on the very same 
basis as the nationalist claims of new African states. African nationalism, previously 
viewed as an existential threat, could actually be used to strengthen the Afrikaner claim 
to legitimacy. The articulation of separate development as facilitating a horizontally 
structured multi-national polity in contrast to a vertically stratified multi-racial one only 
reinforced ‘the inalienable right of each national group’ – Afrikaner and African alike – 
‘to its own particular territory’.36 The argument that the morality of separation derived 
from its facilitation of parallel nationalisms had been stressed in what appears to be the 
first written mention of the term ‘apartheid’ in its modern usage, by Dutch Reformed 
Church pastor J. C. du Plessis in 1929. Rejecting an existing policy that offered blacks 
no ‘independent national future’, du Plessis had advocated that the Gospel be brought to 
bear in a way that fitted the African ‘character, nature and nationality’.37 Now, Vorster 
revived and foregrounded this subordinated element of apartheid discourse: 
[W]hat is the basis of separate development? It is, in the first instance, the right 
of the Whites to preserve their white identity… But what he wants for himself he 
does not begrudge those of other colours in South Africa…[I]f [the black man] 
comes to you and says, I want political rights, then I say to him you may have 
your political rights, but not in my territory… I say to him he can develop into a 
free independent nation in his own territory… Our whole policy is aimed at 
leading [South Africa’s blacks] to independence, to self-determination.38 
The audience for such messages was as much domestic – as with this speech, delivered 
in the small rural town of Naboomspruit - as foreign. Continuing, Vorster told his 
fellow Afrikaners outright: ‘[W]e have too long described ourselves as Europeans to the 
outside world. We are not Europeans, we are of Africa as any other person is of 
Africa.’39  
But how to give this ideological shift from vertical racial hierarchies to parallel 
national communities some policy reinforcement? The Verwoerdian model presented 
apartheid as a monolithic programme. Total separation of the races was both the ends 
and the means; apartheid was, in Verwoerd’s phrasing, ‘a rock of granite’.40 
Conservatives duly rationalised that a crack anywhere in the rock, of any type, only 
weakened the whole. Vorster saw things more pragmatically. Unlike Verwoerd, he had 
never been part of the nationalist intellectual circles of the 1940s and had little time for 
ideological rigidities.
41
 Shortly after becoming prime minister, he reportedly told a 
group of Nationalist Party members of parliament (MPs): 
The cardinal principle of the NP is the retention, maintenance and 
immortalisation of Afrikaner identity within a white sovereign state. Apartheid 
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and separate development is merely a method of bringing this about and making 
it permanent. If there are other better methods of achieving this end, then we 
must find those methods and get on with it.
42
  
For Vorster, the overarching imperative of horizontalising the ideological foundation of 
the social order meant the gradual detachment of petty apartheid, which discriminated 
among South Africans based on race alone, from separate development, which drew 
distinctions based on (attributed) ethnic or national identities.  
Vorster’s new state-building agenda proved destabilising to an Afrikaner 
community accustomed to Verwoerd’s uncompromising assertions of unilateralism, 
hierarchy, and supremacy. Early in Vorster’s tenure, even very minor reforms designed 
to represent a more parallel rather than hierarchical conception of the relationship 
between South Africa’s ethnic communities – such as allowing non-white athletes to 
represent the republic in sporting competitions (although without competing alongside 
or against white South Africans) - provoked a vicious conservative backlash. The 
resulting internecine verlig-verkrampstryd (1968-70), fought between those prepared to 
countenance some minor reforms in order to keep the separate development programme 
compatible with the changing realities of South African society and an evolving world 
(more pragmatic verligte Afrikaners), and those who saw any mitigation of total racial 
separation as opening the door to the eradication of Afrikaner self-determination, 
culture, and viability (dogmatic verkramptes), severely damaged party unity, consumed 
Vorster’s first term as prime minister, and buried his reform agenda.43 Some 
verkramptes saw his reframing of the Verwoerdian gospel as little short of apostasy. A 
former Calvinist minister and editor of the Pretoria daily Hoofstad, Andries Treurnicht, 
provided the intellectual ballast to a political cause more often articulated in cruder 
terms: ‘If petty apartheid lapses completely, then grand apartheid is senseless, 
superfluous, and unnecessary, because if white and non-white are acceptable to one 
another at all levels of everyday life and they mix everywhere without reservation, then 
it is senseless to force them to live in separate states or residential areas.’44 Quite so. 
Vorster ultimately triumphed over his conservative foes, but he did not 
extinguish their cause or ideas. Only four out of 126 Nationalist MPs left the party in 
1969, though at one stage it appeared that perhaps as many as forty would do so.
45
 The 
prime minister crushed the breakaway Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) at the 1970 
national elections and then used his new political mandate to shame leaders of the 
Broederbond, the secretive ethno-nationalist organisation to which many Afrikaner 
elites belonged, into purging renegades from the organisation in the name of preserving 
volk unity.
46
 However, it was evident to all that the HNP constituted only ‘the merest tip 
of a large verkrampte iceberg’, in David Welsh’s phrase.47 In 1969, then chairman Piet 
Meyer had told the Broederbond outright that the notion that good relations between 
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South Africa’s different groups could develop through ‘the removal of so-called “petty 
apartheid”’ was ‘very unrealistic’ and the mark of ‘a spineless Afrikanerdom’.48  
Into the 1970s (and beyond), the persistent claims of verkramptes to be the true 
representatives of Afrikaner values and history directly challenged the NP’s identity as 
the political incarnation of the volk.
49
 This domestic opposition was a critical factor in 
the acceleration of Pretoria’s African outreach from 1970 on. After the verlig-
verkrampstryd, Vorster had limited incentive to pursue his vision through sustained 
domestic reform, thereby risking entanglement once more in destructive internal battles 
over Afrikaner national purity. Instead, he turned to foreign affairs, where he was 
slowly gaining traction with African leaders, where he as prime minister had the most 
freedom of manoeuvre, and where he was least constrained by the entrenched racial and 
nationalist norms of his party.  
 
THE OUTWARD POLICY 
Verwoerd had seen little need to reach out to independent Africa.
50
 ‘It is not that 
we are not willing to enter into friendly relations with any well-disposed African state,’ 
he explained in 1962, ‘But they must first abandon their hostility towards South 
Africa.’51 Where Verwoerd saw an impasse, Vorster instead saw an opportunity. He 
placed the execution of his outward policy in the hands of a small team of trusted 
advisors, comprising Muller as foreign minister, Brand Fourie as secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, and Hendrik van den Bergh as the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) chief.
52
 
Reporting directly to the prime minister, they worked discreetly to open doors to Africa, 
reasoning that if South Africa offered to help African states achieve their goals, then 
those states would embrace mutually advantageous cooperation rather than assuming 




To find common ground, Vorster articulated a new vision for Africa’s future 
grounded in economic development and continental cooperation: interdependence 
between independent states, regardless of colour. ‘The problem of the Third World is 
not political rights, but the very basic necessities for existence like bread and butter and 
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employment,’ Nationalist MP L. A. Pienaar summarised.54 In seeking a discourse 
through which to argue this new model of post-independence African politics and a 
network through which to connect South Africa with potential fellow-minded states, the 
language and structures of the Cold War provided ready tools. Vorster and his team 
appreciated not only that anti-communist (or ‘moderate’) African states were distinctly 
more receptive to their overtures than radical ones whose ideologies dictated a more 
militant brand of anti-colonialism, but that by constructing relationships with the former 
it could help deepen the cleavage between the two blocs.
55
 Given the ‘Russian 
penetration and violence that Africa is facing’ and ‘the Red-Chinese belt in Africa’, 
Vorster suggested in 1971, ‘the leaders in Africa who are concerned about the peace and 
the security and the prosperity of Africa should find and understand each other.’56 Three 
years later, he extended this vision, predicting that South Africa’s engagement with its 
black neighbours would form the basis of ‘a power bloc... against communism’.57 
Pretoria therefore strove not merely to take advantage of African regimes’ Cold War 
loyalties, but to strengthen those identifications and commensurately weaken the 
importance of anti-apartheid militancy as a central ideological pillar of African state 
identity.  
This pitch to reshape the contours of African geopolitics was well timed. By the 
late 1960s, militancy against white rule had run aground. In 1968-69, only four African 
states bothered to pay their Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Liberation 
Committee dues.
58
 This situation both reflected and spurred a much broader failing to 
articulate state identities that were substantively broader than mere opposition to 
ongoing white rule as a symbol of the colonial past. In francophone Africa, institutions 
like the African and Malagasy Common Organisation (OCAM), created in 1965 to 
sustain a moderate françafrique vision of close links to Paris and broadly status quo 
social structures, were collapsing into irrelevance; only three heads of state attended its 
1973 summit in Mauritius.
59
 This crisis of state identity spurred two trends. First, 
African leaders increasingly articulated their ruling ideologies in Cold War terms. As 
Frederick Cooper contends, rulers found themselves in charge of ‘gatekeeper’ states, 
with legitimacy coming from foreign recognition of their ownership of the gate. As 
leaders searched for ideologies to help them govern what were often fractious and 
unstable societies, they became increasingly receptive to those with external legitimacy, 
whether radical-communist or conservative-‘free world’.60 Second, African leaders’ 
heightened sensitivity to the precariousness of power amid extensive political instability 
provided an incentive to entrench the boundaries of political contest in the nation-state 
while shunning transnational claims on their citizens’ identities (and, potentially, 
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 Both developments favoured Pretoria’s promotion of the inviolable state as 
the essential principle of Africa’s future, while also providing favourable intellectual 
terrain for Pretoria’s efforts to exile anti-apartheid militancy, with its explicit challenge 
to that principle, to the radical agenda. At the June 1971 Addis Ababa summit of the 
OAU, a body largely defined by the twin causes of opposition to white rule and pan-
African unity, no fewer than six anti-communist states – Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, 
Malawi, the Malagasy Republic, and Mauritius – risked being seen as sell-outs on both 
fronts by voting against a resolution that rejected engagement with Pretoria, in effect 
repudiating the existing approach of confrontation and isolation. A further five out the 
thirty-nine states present abstained.
62
 ‘We have cut the black countries to our north 
completely in half – they are at one another’s throats’, Vorster later exaggerated to 
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith.
63
 
Yet Vorster sought not only to build new relationships with African states in an 
effort to alleviate international isolation, but also to parlay Africa’s engagement with the 
regime into a more enduring ideological foundation for the state’s legitimacy. He duly 
mobilised the new and tentative co-existence with African nationalism on the continent 
behind the old Verwoerdian argument that separate development was the only means of 
enabling each of South Africa’s ethnic groups to exercise their right to self-
determination. On one front, Pretoria’s new willingness to engage with independent 
African states was advertised as proving its good faith regarding co-existence within 
South Africa. In the wake of the June 1971 OAU summit, Vorster used the diplomatic 
gains abroad to energise his domestic agenda, embarking on a week-long ‘listening 
tour’ of the homelands. Simultaneously, the white polity’s ability to interact 
productively with the new homeland entities was presented as a symbol of its readiness 
to co-exist with African nationalism across the continent. In a 1969 speech at the 
Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns [Academy for Science and Art], Vorster spelled this 
out: ‘[W]hat I consider most important of all, what will eventually turn the scale in our 
policy of co-operation with Africa, is that, slowly but surely, it is becoming clear to the 
African states that we are absolutely honest towards our own black peoples within our 
borders.’64 Better ties with Africa and Vorster’s state-building agenda at home thus 
became mutually reinforcing programmes. This was not a charade intended for foreign 
consumption, but a top-down campaign to promote a new ideological foundation for 
South Africa’s social, political, and economic structures – and one that captivated its 
advocates. Foreign Minister Muller scrawled excitedly on one letter from Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs Fourie:  
Most [foreign observers] fail to see that the position in SA is changing – not as a 
result of pressure from without, not in the form of concessions for favours (eg. 
Respectability) – not as a quid pro quo – not as a result of fear or eagerness to 
win friends – but as a result of the implementation of the policies of the Govt, re 
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the various non white peoples. Policies consistently declared & maintained and 
implemented with increasing speed... to achieve self-determination.
65
 
To Vorster’s team there was no contradiction between hosting Banda and imposing 
apartheid. Rather, the two phenomena were perfectly compatible under the cardinal 
principle of respecting each national community’s right to fulfilment and independence.  
Accordingly, as African leaders began engaging with Pretoria on a regular basis, 
Vorster exploited the atmosphere of flux created on the domestic political scene to 
signal a move away from the hierarchical racism of the past. ‘Under no circumstances 
should you slight a person who speaks a different language, whose skin is a different 
colour, who has a different standard of civilization,’ he declared in 1970, ‘You must 
never adopt the attitude that you are better than another person.’66 The next year, he 
went further: ‘If your policy is founded on your being better than someone else because 
you have a white skin, it is wrong, foolish and vain. What are you but a creature of God, 
as he is, to raise yourself and think you are better than he?’67 These were truly radical 
statements in the context of the policies of his party and the racial mores of his 
electorate. More was to come. During Banda’s state visit in 1971, Vorster allowed 
himself to be photographed sitting between two black women. This was nothing short of 
scandalous to verkramptes: the photo appeared in every copy of the HNP’s publication 
Die Afrikaner for months afterwards. 
Vorster’s outward policy experienced only mixed success on the international 
stage. In 1969, fourteen Eastern and Southern African leaders signed the ‘Lusaka 
Manifesto’, which stood firm on militancy towards Portugal and Rhodesia while 
qualifying the existing support for armed struggle against South Africa.
68
 African 
leaders were prepared to flirt with abandoning their commitment to bringing down the 
apartheid regime on the grounds that the existing OAU policies of blanket hostility, 
economic boycott, and support for liberation movements were proving ineffective. 
However, Vorster’s broadening of the conversation with independent Africa did not 
eliminate the fundamental abhorrence many African leaders felt towards a system 
deeply redolent of the racism and exploitation they associated with their own 
experiences of colonialism.  
Even Banda, the leader with whom Pretoria found the warmest reception, 
reflected the tension between these two impulses. His diplomats saw the OAU as 
‘vocal’ and ‘emotional’, and its anti-apartheid militancy as yielding only ‘popular but 
unrealistic pronouncements or policies’.69 He also defined his governing ideology 
against the ‘other’ of communist power, rather than white rule. In a personal letter he 
told Kenneth Kaunda that he ‘bitterly resented’ the Zambian President’s criticism of 
Malawi’s cooperation with Pretoria: ‘More than once, you have sent your Ministers to 
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Russia, China and other countries for discussion or negotiations on trade and other 
matters. Neither I nor any of my Ministers or anyone else in this country, has ever said a 
single word against you personally… [b]ecause, we feel it is none of our business 
whatsoever.’70 This encapsulated at one stroke the fusion of anti-communism and state-
based geopolitics grounded in non-interference that Pretoria was promoting on the 
continent. However, having worked as a young man in the mines near Johannesburg, 
where racial oppression and economic exploitation went hand in hand, Banda was under 
no illusions about the power structures of apartheid. His unpublished autobiography, 
which he wrote while imprisoned by the British at Gwelo in 1959-60, relates: ‘The idea 
behind the policy of apartheid, is not justice and equity to the Africans, but rigid control 
over them, in order, the better and more effectively, to keep them in perpetual 
subjection and serfdom.’71 Even as he accepted a soft loan from Pretoria to build a new 
capital city and fulfil his modernisation agenda, he told South African officials, ‘I am as 
strongly opposed to apartheid, colonialism and discrimination as is any other African 
leader’.72 There was extensive talk in verligte circles about granting meaningful rights 
to Africans living in urban areas, repealing large swathes of the most offensive petty 
apartheid legislation, and deracialising public spaces en masse. ‘In South Africa we 
have a government and a people that is moving away from racism, that is moving away 
from discrimination, that wants to rectify it and get it out of its system,’ announced 
promising MP Louis Nel.
73
 However, the relative lack of concrete legislation to give 
effect to the vaunted flattening of South Africa’s racial hierarchies was a major obstacle 
to recalibrating African understandings of what separate development entailed.  
From its height in 1971, the outward policy stalled as radicals effectively 
reinvigorated the cause of anti-apartheid militancy. In 1972, the ‘Mogadishu 
Declaration’ largely repudiated the ‘Lusaka Manifesto’ in favour of a return to blanket 
confrontation. By early 1973, one BOSS analysis of the African scene observed starkly: 
‘In the face of the stronger military disposition and the formal rejection by the OAU of 
dialogue with South Africa as a path to reaching a modus vivendi, the enthusiasm of 
supporters of dialogue has faded and with it our hope for the expansion of our outward 
policy.’74  
However, instead of reassessing the feasibility of their new models of African 
identity, South African policymakers perceived in the recent setbacks only a case for 
renewed efforts to stop Pretoria’s relationship with Africa being hijacked by 
communist-backed radicals. ‘If it were not for the interference on the part of Russian 
militarism and Chinese insurgence, we would reach an agreement with Africa,’ 
concluded Defence Minister P. W. Botha.
75
 Indeed, Vorster’s new thinking soon 
became entrenched in policymaking circles as establishing a strategic template for long-
term viability. Far from apartheid constituting a barrier to the regime’s acceptance on 
the continent, the government rationalised that it was especially among African leaders, 
as Muller put it, that South Africa’s ‘bona fides [would] not be generally accepted until 
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we have taken our policy to its full consequences, in other words, until the homelands 
have become independent states.’76 By the time regime change in Portugal shifted South 
Africa’s strategic calculus in April 1974, South Africa’s foreign policy rested on three 
principles: first, that a distinction existed between African states’ declared opposition to 
apartheid and their willingness to act to overturn it; second, that this distinction was 
congruent with the fissure between moderate and radical regimes on the continent, not 
with the division between white and black ones; and finally, that through judicious 
diplomacy that distinction could be maintained and exploited, buying South Africa time 
to grant its black peoples self-determination through the homelands, convince the world 
of the legitimacy of these polities, and eventually overturn Africa’s opposition to 
Pretoria. ‘The policy of separate development can be sold in Africa,’ the prime minister 





The decision by the new Portuguese regime to withdraw from Angola and Mozambique 
alarmed many within the South African power structure. The halcyon days of the 
cordon sanitaire were over. ‘There was an immediate sense that… there was a change 
and it was a change not for the better’, recalled Jeremy Shearar, Chargé d’Affaires at the 
South African embassy in London.
78
 ‘It is clear that our adversaries smell blood,’ 
reported the South African mission to the UN.
79
  
Vorster saw things differently. The prime minister understood that his inability 
to match his Africanisation programme with much more than token reductions in 
military and diplomatic support for Salisbury and Lisbon, as well as South Africa’s 
continued dominion over South-West Africa (SWA), substantially undermined the 
government’s efforts to dispel widespread perceptions of the regime as a form of 
colonial rule. In 1968, Kaunda had written to Vorster: ‘It is only South Africa’s 
apparent decision to throw her lot in with the rebel regime in Rhodesia which has 
brought her into the full focus of criticism by the rest of the international community.’ 
That apart, the Zambian president continued, he ‘certainly would be interested’ to learn 
more about Pretoria’s envisaged program of leading its African communities towards 
self-determination.
80
 Now, Vorster saw that circumstances had presented a prime 
opportunity to reinforce the regime’s move away from racial hierarchies and bolster 
South Africa’s case for a moderate and interdependent Africa as an alternative to the 
ascendant radicalism that demanded the destruction of the white regime. The 
appropriation of the ‘détente’ label itself for the new venture was a clear nod to 
Pretoria’s desire to embed African geopolitics in an explicitly Cold War context – as 
defined by the apartheid regime. 
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The first test came in Mozambique. With independence pending, Ian Smith 
asked Vorster to help Mozambican separatists establish a rump state south of the 
Zambezi River friendly to both Rhodesia and South Africa.
81
 Pretoria was also 
approached by white settler or multi-racial but right-wing groups seeking support, 
funds, and arms for coups in both Angola (by at least five separate groups between 
April and September 1974) and Mozambique (at least three groups).
82
 All received short 
shrift: they missed that Vorster was less interested in maintaining a white-ruled neo-
colonial status quo than in creating a brand new architecture for international co-
existence on the continent. To the prime minister, the incoming wave of decolonisation 
posed no threat to South Africa: 
We must view the developments in Moçambique in the light of our own policy, 
which is based on self-determination. Several neighbouring countries are under 
Black governments and we ourselves are in the process of creating some more 
by leading our own Black homelands to independence.  
The emergence of a Black government in Moçambique therefore does not upset 
us in the least.  
OR   
is but another proof that our policy based on self-determination [in contrast to 
Portugal’s policy of assimilation] is a sound one.83 
Mozambique was just the beginning. Vorster simultaneously sought to shift 
perceptions of his regime’s role in SWA. Already in August 1973, he had announced 
his intention to usher SWA towards a controlled form of majority rule.
84
 Now, a top 
secret committee known as Bronze – featuring among others Fourie, van den Bergh, and 
local white representatives – met to explore ways in which SWA could become fully 




Finally, Vorster turned his attention to the long-running political impasse in 
Rhodesia. Over the previous year, he had repeatedly overruled Botha’s and the defence 
force’s recommendations of new military assistance to the beleaguered Smith regime.86 
Now, the prime minister’s second thoughts gave way to strident action. From his 
backchannel conversations with the Zambians, Fourie reported that black Rhodesian 
expectations had escalated.
87
 Vorster concluded that the Smith regime had become more 
of a liability than an ally. If South Africa were to co-exist peacefully with black Africa 
in the new environment, the cautious and piecemeal approach of the outward policy 
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would not be enough. Seizing the initiative, Vorster resolved to ride the wave of re-
energised African nationalism and work with regional leaders to broker the removal of 
white minority rule in Rhodesia. 
With this in mind, Vorster sat down secretly with Kaunda’s right-hand man, 
Mark Chona, in Cape Town. Chona told the leader of the apartheid regime that he spoke 
not only for Kaunda, but had also met with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Seretse Khama 
of Botswana, Frelimo President Samora Machel, and interim Mozambican Prime 
Minister Joaquim Chissano. All had reiterated the Lusaka Manifesto’s 
acknowledgement of Pretoria’s non-colonial status ‘in the strongest possible terms’. 
They saw South Africa as an ‘independent and sovereign state’ and agreed that the 
Afrikaners were ‘not merely people in Africa, but people of Africa’. As Chona stressed 
on no fewer than five occasions during the conversation, Africa would not ‘take the 
fight’ to South Africa and there was ‘no question of interfering in [its] internal affairs.’ 
Instead, Africa sought Pretoria’s co-operation on the Rhodesian issue, which was ‘a 
stumbling block in trying to get Africa to understand the South African problem’ which 
was ‘totally different’.88 Without evidence from the Zambian archives to contextualise 
this extraordinary meeting from Chona’s perspective, it is hard to know if he was just 
telling Vorster what he wanted to hear, or if some black African leaders had accepted 
that avoiding a brutal racial war across the region required Pretoria’s co-operation 
regardless of the signal it sent to black South Africans – or a bit of both. Regardless, 
Vorster was more than receptive. He and Chona spent the afternoon constructing a 
detailed framework to remove the ‘stumbling block’ to Pretoria’s acceptance as a full 
part of Africa. 
As détente dramatically materialised in the southern autumn of 1974, with 
Kaunda and Vorster publicly acting out a carefully choreographed scene of 
reconciliation and co-operation, and Ian Smith reluctantly agreeing to resurrect 
negotiations, two powerful critiques emerged on Vorster’s domestic front. First, Botha 
and the military were ardently opposed to the new direction on security grounds. Instead 
of seeing the decolonisation of the Portuguese colonies as an opportunity to prove the 
regime’s ability to coexist peacefully with black African governments, they saw events 
through the prism of a communist-backed OAU assault against white rule in Southern 
Africa. ‘[T]he change of government in Mozambique is certainly the greatest potential 
threat which [South Africa] has ever had,’ the defence minister wrote in a strident letter 
to his prime minister. The OAU’s ‘ideology has already for a long time declared war on 
the white ruled states – because they are white, and because the power is in white 
hands’, he asserted; accordingly, ‘the longer Rhodesia can remain standing the more 
advantageous it will be for [South Africa]’.89 In party forums, such as the annual 
congress of the Cape NP in September 1975, Botha proclaimed that he ‘identified 
wholeheartedly with the détente policy’.90 In reality, Botha and the military continued to 
believe that the OAU’s drive ‘to force the existing order in white-ruled Southern Africa 
to change’ would be relentless due to the inherently expansionist doctrines of its 
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 In handwritten notes for his contribution to the annual no 
confidence debate in February 1975, Botha revealed his true feelings: ‘Nie détente nie – 
maar appeasement – paaiery! (Not détente – but appeasement – appeasement!)’92 
On a separate front, many in the electorate were instinctively resistant to the 
notion that Pretoria might ‘sell out’ the white Rhodesians and failed to see how 
abandoning one of South Africa’s few allies constituted wise foreign policy. In June 
1975, Vorster and Smith attended a rugby match between South Africa and France at 
Loftus Versfeld, Pretoria. When Vorster’s presence was announced by loudspeaker, he 
received warm applause; but when the embattled Smith was introduced, the crowd went 
into raptures.
93
 Vorster had to avoid getting too far out in front of these popular attitudes 
and allowing détente to become a focal point for the ‘fifth column’ of far-right wingers 
who remained in his party even after the traumatic HNP breakaway.
94
 From the NP’s 
own back-benches, Treurnicht criticised those ‘urging that South Africa should 
dissociate itself from Rhodesia… and that Rhodesia should stew in its own juice’.95 It 
was not only on the far-right that such ideas reverberated. In October 1974, Ben 
Schoeman, Vorster’s recently retired deputy prime minister and former leader of the 
Transvaal NP, launched a blistering attack on détente in a speech in Kimberley:  
I think that we as White people must be under no illusions. The Black military 
states with their Communist allies have only one aim and object in view and that 
is the surrender of the White man in South Africa. Nothing less than Black 
majority rule will ever satisfy them. Those misguided people who believe that 
appeasement will satisfy them are living in a fool’s paradise.96  
The reality was that outside Vorster’s foreign policy circle, white South Africans 
were fundamentally conflicted over détente. They were excited by the prospect of an 
end to confrontation, violence, and isolation. ‘There is a curious mood in the Republic 
today which is almost euphoric,’ observed London’s Financial Times in a feature 
article. ‘For the first time for well over a decade White South Africans, pilloried and 
isolated in the international community, now believe they are well on the way to 
acceptability. They find it a heady experience.’97 However, white South Africans were 
reluctant to stomach the steps Vorster was outlining as necessary to achieve these ends: 
a move away from the old affinities of the white redoubt, with all that entailed for shifts 
in racially hierarchical thinking more broadly. 
Vorster worked hard to neutralise these fears and condition public opinion to 
support his diplomacy. Through confidential briefings of newspaper editors – some of 
which he conducted personally in the cabinet room – the prime minister ensured that 
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both the Afrikaans- and English-language dailies showed striking support for his 
counter-intuitive initiatives.
98
 The press largely avoided any implication that South 
Africa was interfering in Rhodesia’s affairs and explicitly assured readers that a 
settlement in Salisbury would not create momentum towards a transfer of power in 
South Africa because the racial orders in the two were different. ‘For now, the details of 
the settlement agreement are Rhodesia’s responsibility’, Die Transvaler editorialised: 
In South Africa many people argue emotionally about Rhodesia because 
whites are involved. They consider South Africa’s position as analogous 
to Rhodesia’s. Our policy however guarantees separate development and 
the authority [seggenskap] of each group over its own affairs. This 
eliminates the whole question of majority rule in South Africa.
99
  
This delicate recalibration of the argument over détente and the accompanying subtle 
neutralisation of the population’s pan-white sympathies was precisely what Vorster 
sought. The prime minister likewise ensured that Muller told the Perskor newspapers 
not to publish a word of Schoeman’s Kimberley speech. (The task of speaking to the 
Cape-based Nasionale Pers papers was delegated to P. W. Botha, a member of its board, 
who neglected to convey the message.
100
) Ultimately, opponents of détente could not 
match Vorster’s offers of access or patronage and found their perspectives marginalised. 
Schoeman later raged in his memoirs against a rare ‘unholy alliance between the liberal 
English press and certain of our Afrikaans newspapers... on Rhodesia they spoke with 
one voice.’101 
Vorster also sought to use the Broederbond to market détente within elite 
Afrikaner circles. In both November 1974 and February 1975, Vorster appeared before 
the Broederbond’s Executive Council (Uitvoerende Raad, UR). On both occasions, he 
stressed that events compelled the government to act decisively. ‘Urgent action is 
necessary’, he said in November; ‘We must consider what is necessary to maintain 
control over our political destiny and ensure our White identity’, he echoed in 
February.
102
 Although such views were doubtless distributed to each of the 
Broederbond chapters, Vorster’s message was not alone. In May 1975, the UR tabled its 
own extended study of détente. The study was careful to display support for the merits 
of Vorster’s overall vision:  
Détente must serve as a prerequisite for the development of a situation of real 
peace, where sovereign states exist alongside each other and where 
simultaneously there reigns cooperation on all levels of common interest, 
without ceding one’s own identity and without the interference of one in the 
internal affairs of the other. 
However, it continued, while the OAU had at times embraced negotiation (the Lusaka 
Manifesto) and other times confrontation (the Mogadishu Declaration), its commitment 
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to the removal of white rule as a whole remained unchanged. ‘One thing remains 
however consistently clear, and this is that African countries will never change course 
on their ultimate aims in Southern Africa,’ the report stated. Africa and Pretoria had 
‘irreconcilable aims’. The unmistakeable implication - that Vorster’s dream of peaceful 
co-existence with African nationalism was not realisable - was clear enough.
103
 For all 
Vorster’s efforts, opposition to détente persisted. When he addressed the NP caucus in 
late February 1975, with détente foundering on Smith’s intransigence, Vorster’s words 
pointed to the unspoken divisions within his own party: ‘We have to stand together. We 
can never always stand together, but standing together [now] is essential. Our calling is 
to live in Africa.’104 
Despite these misgivings, Vorster’s improbable ideas gained substantial traction. 
By the end of 1974, his idea of horizontal co-existence had become the core of a new 
Africanised identity for the regime, providing Afrikanerdom with much needed ethno-
nationalist direction in the wake of the verlig-verkrampstryd. Emerging MP Dawie de 
Villiers, a future minister in the Botha and F. W. de Klerk governments, as well as the 
post-apartheid Government of National Unity, encapsulated the new thinking: ‘We shall 
have to give more content to our African identity… In order to be able to do this, we 
shall have to give up many of our prejudices concerning Africa and the people of 
Africa.’105 Pienaar used Vorster’s new ideology to hammer the opposition United Party 
(UP) for maintaining an antiquated policy of ‘one united colonially inspired South 
Africa’. The UP ‘had only one idea: of the White man governing the Black man in 
South Africa.’ This stood in stark contrast, he insisted, to Nationalist policy: ‘[W]e have 
changed to a South Africa which is being shared... The decolonisation process has been 
tackled successfully… When the winds of change blew through Africa it was the 
National Party which conceived the idea of the liberation and decolonisation of the 
Bantu peoples of South Africa.’106 The government even portrayed African outreach as 
a long-standing Nationalist tradition. ‘Even the Voortrekkers established relations with 
Bantu chiefs for diplomatic affairs,’ the 1974 election manifesto informed voters.107 
‘The White Nationalist has never at any time seen himself as a colonialist in Africa. He 
has never at any time been afraid of the upsurging nationalism among the Blacks and he 
does not disregard the right of the Blacks to self-determination,’ proclaimed MP J. J. 
Engelbrecht.
108
 The shift in the historicisation of Afrikanerdom’s relationship with 
African nationalism since Verwoerd’s Blood River speech was unmistakeable.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In his analysis of South Africa’s relations with black Africa, Roger Pfister suggests that 
South Africa’s diplomacy during this period constituted an effort to convince Africans 
that ‘not all whites supported apartheid’.109 Not so. Instead, John Vorster attempted to 
use diplomatic successes in black Africa to drive an unlikely relegitimisation of 
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apartheid as a system compatible with post-independence norms of self-determination, 
development, and  state autonomy. Unwilling to change what apartheid was, he resolved 
to change what it meant. This unlikely initiative was launched on two fronts: persuading 
black Africa that apartheid meant something new by rearticulating existing racial 
hierarchies in the language of parallel national development, thereby Africanising the 
identity of Afrikaner nationalism; and convincing white South Africa that the discrete 
racist measures of petty apartheid could be jettisoned from the programme of separate 
development without injury to the original Verwoerdian master plan.  
This story eclipses conventional understandings of the relationship between the 
apartheid regime and independent Africa in the broader context of decolonisation. 
Vorster's outward and détente policies constituted attempts to create an alternative 
model of African identity governed by discourses of non-interference, mutual economic 
development, and anti-communism, thereby enabling the polity to reach across the 
colour line and lay an equal claim to the power and protection of African 
nationalism. This was far from a refusal to acknowledge that the age of white 
supremacy was over; it was, in fact, a recognition that changed times required the 
adoption of new paradigms of security and legitimacy. Indeed, Vorster was willing to 
go further still and abandon the racial bonds of the white redoubt: he reconceptualised 
the category of ‘whiteness’ in national rather than racially supremacist terms and trading 
in the anchor of ‘European’ that had featured so prominently in Verwoerd’s ideological 
legacy for the unlikely identity of ‘African’.110 These counter-intuitive efforts 
demonstrate the potency of post-war norms of non-racial governance. Even Pretoria, 
supposedly the ultimate hold out, took them firmly into account. These efforts also 
support historians’ growing appreciation of decolonisation as a multi-faceted contest 
replete with conflict, failure, and contradiction, rather than as a set of north-south 
transfers of political power.
111
 Further, this analysis contributes to emerging 
understandings within African historiography of the racial categories underpinning 
national identities as politically malleable, rather than rigid in meaning or content.
112
 
From here, we can begin to bridge the history of state-building in early independent 
black Africa with that of ideological renewal and nationalist introspection in apartheid 
South Africa.  
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